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The  Coasean  way to deal with the cooperation failure that is implicit in Pareto 
inefficiency  is  to  remove  or  lessen  the  obstacles  to  cooperation  through  the 
attribution of property rights and the elimination or reduction of transaction costs. 
The relevance of this approach is however undermined by some intrinsic difficulties 
to its application in a real world context, such as those arising from the number and 
indeterminacy of the interested parties, as well as from the free rider problem. A 
way to extend the Coasean approach taking into account those real life limitations is 
to  consider  the  local  authorities  as  representatives  of  the  interest  of  their  local 
constituencies and, through the provision of an adequate institutional framework, to 
enhance the opportunities for cooperation through voluntary agreements involving 
private and public parties. Thus the extent of cooperation could be widened, as 
opposite  to  traditional  remedial  actions  relying  on  non-contractual,  or  direct 
entrepreneurial action by the state. With the reduction in the appeal of direct and 
coercive action by the state a number of institutions emphasising the contractual 
cooperation  between  public  and  private  parties  have  effectively  grown  of 
importance, as wide apart as the township and village enterprises in China, or the 
“programmazione  negoziata”  in  Italy.  In  the  final  part  of  the  paper  the  latter 
experience is briefly reviewed and appraised. 
 
Keywords: cooperation, coordination, Coase theorem, economic policy, territorial 
pacts, transition.  
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“social sciences progress by means of concepts”  
(Von Hayek, quoted in Moulin, 1986, p. 6) 
1.  COORDINATION,  COOPERATION,  AND  THE  COASEAN  APPROACH  TO  ECONOMIC 
POLICY 
1.1  Coordination and Cooperation 
The  concept  of  coordination  refers  to  the  carrying  out  of  a  set  of  activities  by 
different individuals so as make them compatible, in order to attain a given social 
(favourable,  at  any  rate  better  than  without  coordination)  result.  Coordinating 
decisions,  and  the  resulting  activities,  is  the  basic  task  of  an  economic  system, 
indeed,  of  any  social  system.  Coordination  can  be  conscious  and  aimed  for, 
according to a voluntary agreement, and may then be called cooperation, or can 
result from separate individual decisions, such as in Nash equilibrium, or in the 
paradigm of the invisible hand. In the general equilibrium formalization of the latter 
there is (implicitly at least) bilateral cooperation between buyers and sellers.
1 The 
overall  outcome  however  involves  the  attainment  of  a  Pareto  efficient  state  for 
society as a whole; thus bilateral cooperation results in overall (Pareto) efficient 
coordination.  In  the  general  case  of  Nash  equilibrium  (where  individuals  act 
independently  of  explicit  agreements)  the  outcome  may  turn  out  to  be  Pareto 
inferior to some other state that could be attained through cooperation, leading to 
                                                 
1 Even if markets are described as impersonal and in thick markets, in particular, 
cooperation may be reduced to the bare element of purchasing and selling a standard 
commodity  at  a  given  market  price,  transactions  in  the  end  take  place  between 
individual sellers and individual buyers. In general the market system relies on the 
fact  that  satisfactory  overall  coordination  can  be  achieved  through  institutions 
leading to limited cooperation, amounting in most cases to bilateral exchange. On 
the other hand in the case of the traditional planned socialist economy, coordination 
is basically achieved through commands, even if there may be substantial elements 
of cooperation, bilateral or otherwise.   
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what may be called a cooperation failure. On the other hand, to be stuck in a Nash 
equilibrium  when  there  is  an  alternative  Pareto  superior  one  is  referred  to  as  a 
coordination  failure,  as  in  this  case  the  superior  outcome  does  not  necessarily 
require  explicit  cooperation:  if  only  the  separate  self-interested  agents  were  to 
behave differently (for instance because of different expectations as to the other 
agents’ rational behaviour or on government policy), a better social state could be 
achieved in an alternative equilibrium situation, even without explicitly striking a 
deal.  For  instance,  in  the  macroeconomic  theoretical  case  of  multiple  equilibria 
arising from strategic complementarity,
2 the different possible Nash equilibria could 
depend on different levels of self-fulfilling expectations as to the level of demand.
3 
In case a Nash equilibrium is Pareto dominated by another state that is not a Nash 
equilibrium, as in the case of the usual one-shot Prisoner Dilemma, or in the fixed 
time  span  Prisoner  Dilemma  supergame,
4  the  Pareto  superior  state  could  in 
principle be achieved through cooperation, if cooperation is possible, which usually 
means if deals are enforceable. On the other hand it is well known that, in case of an 
infinitely  repeated  game,  every  Pareto  efficient  outcome  dominating  a  Nash 
equilibrium  can  be  sustained,  even  without  explicit  agreements,  if  everybody 
expects Nash reversion
5 as a punishing strategy, provided the discount factors are 
high  enough  (intertemporal  preferences  are  not  too  myopic).  If  the  expected 
                                                 
2 This occurs whenever “increased effort by other agents leads the remaining agent to 
follow suit” (Cooper, 1999, p.19). 
3 Cf. e. g. Cooper (1999).  
4 This means a game composed of a sequence of one-shot (stage) games. If the time-
horizon is fixed, because of backward induction the solution becomes the repetition 
of  the  inefficient  Nash  equilibrium  of  one-shot  games,  since  the  dominating 
cooperative solution cannot be sustained by the self-interest of the players. 
5 This means the return to the strategy bringing about the dominated Nash equilibrium 
for the indeterminate future.  
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punishing  strategy  is  more  severe,  the  above  applies  to  every  outcome  that  is 
associated  with  greater  payoffs  than  those  compatible  with  the  maximum 
punishment the other parties can inflict (this means payoffs that are individually 
rational).
6 In this we have a kind of implicit cooperation, based upon no explicit 
agreement, but on the expectation of sanctions by the other players to bring about 
an expected loss in case of non conforming behaviour. 
1.2  Pareto Inefficiency as Cooperation Failure 
Generally speaking, however, Pareto sub-optimality is tantamount to cooperation 
failure,  as  by  its  very  nature  a  Pareto  inferior  state  could  always  be  improved 
through cooperation, if cooperation finds no obstacle or constraint. In a nutshell this 
could  be  seen  as  the  essence  of  the  so-called  Coase  theorem.
7  However,  for 
(explicit) cooperation to be possible a set of conditions are required. The first is that 
the agreements involved in cooperation should be implemented. This is not too 
complicated  when  they  are  struck  among  a  limited  number  of  agents  and  are 
enacted simultaneously, such as in barter or spot market exchanges. Even in this 
basic case however some general requirements concerning law and order must be 
fulfilled.  For  instance,  the  possibility  for  an  agent,  instead  of  entering  into  a 
mutually advantageous exchange, to grab somebody else’s assets with dexterity or 
force,  and  get  away  with  that,  or  to  cheat,  misrepresenting  the  nature  of  the 
exchange,  should  be  prevented;  in  other  terms  property  rights  into  the  possible 
objects of exchange and rules determining the requirements of proper behaviour 
should  be  established,  if  only,  minimally,  by  the  power  of  custom  and  social 
conventions  (such  as  in  tribal  trades,  or  trades  along  the  old  prehistorical  trade 
                                                 
6 This is the content of the famed Folk theorem; see Mas Colell et al., 1995, pp. 418-
423. 
7 See Coase, 1960. The nature of the “Coase theorem” has been amply debated in the 
literature. See for instance Usher (1998), Dixit and Olson (2000), where further 
bibliographical references could be found.  
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routes that operated in distant past,
8 even without the disciplining power of a state). 
But  the  requirement  of  implementation  becomes  more  demanding  whenever 
exchanges acquire, as is often the case, an inter-temporal dimension. In this case the 
problem arises of what would prevent agents who have to perform subsequently to 
behave opportunistically, not performing their side of the deal.  
This issue is most clearly stated by Hobbes in well-known passage:
9 
 
“If  a  covenant  be  made  wherein  neither  of  the  parties  perform 
presently, but trust one another … upon any reasonable suspicion, 
it is void: but if there be a common power set over them both, with 
right and force sufficient to compel performance, it is not void. For 
he that performeth first has no assurance the other will perform 
after, because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's 
ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of 
some coercive power” 
 
To keep one’s pledge and avoid behaving opportunistically can be induced by ethics 
or  reputation,  and  by  the  incentives  provided  by  the  perspective  of  repeated 
exchanges, but usually requires some kind of outside sanction, if only to support the 
maintenance of the ethical values or habits that may be furthered and strengthened 
by compliance, and jeopardized by the experience of successful violation. Sanctions 
could be administered spontaneously by altruistic punishment,
10 but usually require 
                                                 
8 See Hermann, 1965, ch. 1. 
9 Hobbes, 1651, chapter xiv (“Of the First and Second Natural Laws, and of 
Contracts”), p. 84. 
10 Indeed, according to Fehr and Gächter (2002), “cooperation flourishes if altruistic 
punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out”. This may contribute to 
explain  part  of  the  economic  success  of  Far-eastern  societies  where  “shame” 
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the  existence  of  some  specific  institutions,  such  as  courts,  police,  state 
administration. The way in which these institutions are generated and maintained 
lies outside the scope of this paper and is the object matter of political theory.
11 
Whenever  lack  of  ex  post  enforcement  of  ex-ante  agreements  blocks  potential 
efficiency improving transactions, a crucial task of the state is to perform as the 
enforcer. The importance of the state as the enforcer of contracts is borne out in 
particular  by  the  recent  experience  of  transition  economies.  While  direct 
management of the economy by the state has proved relatively wasteful, according 
to the overall experience of the last century, the experience of transition countries 
has on the contrary proved how essential the role of the state is as a guarantor of 
public order and of law enforcement, the enforcement of contracts in particular.
12,13 
Even independently of the issue of enforcement there are a number of difficulties in 
practice that could prevent theoretically possible cooperative deals to be struck:  
1.  Information. There are two sets of issues: a) Who may benefit from cooperative 
agreements? How to find them? b) What are the real characteristics of the object 
of  contracting?  Through  deceit  they  could  be  quite  different  as  it  appears, 
whenever, as usually is the case, information is asymmetric, and this possibility 
                                                                                                                                        
allegedly plays a much more important social role than in the West (on this point see 
Lall, 1998). 
11 In this game theory is the source of some interesting lines of thought; for the game-
theoretical approach to the issue of the origin of the state, see Taylor, 1987 and the 
literature quoted there. 
12 There are many areas where economic recovery has been hampered by lack of 
contract  enforcement.  For  an  interesting  example  in  the  area  of  agriculture,  see 
O'Brien et alii (1999), p. 29. 
13 The issue of how to enforce cooperative agreements is important but obviously it is 
not the only relevant one. Another related aspect is the fundamental impact of the 
quality of institutions and government policies on productivity and growth: cf. Hall 
and Jones, 1998; Knack, 1999.  
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may  block  possible  Pareto  improving  transactions,  hindering  the  opening  of 
potential markets.
14  
2.  Cost of contracting: how much would it cost to get the parties together and to 
organize the agreement? 
3.  Bargaining: how to divide the gains that could be obtained by the agreement? 
For  instance,  under  realistic  circumstances  of  fundamental  uncertainty  and 
private information, somebody could block the agreement with the strategic aim 
of forcing the surrender of almost all the gains to himself. In the process no 
agreement may be reached.  
4.  Free riding, whenever the benefits of an agreement could be reaped, because of 
externalities, by those who choose not to be part to it and to avoid paying the 
costs that its implementation may require. 
The  advantage  of  coordination  through  thick  markets  as  a  way  to  reach,  if  not 
optimal, at least comparatively satisfactory societal outcomes lies in the fact that 
these are attained by-passing the above difficulties that bedevil cooperation. 
1.3  The Coasean Approach to Economic Policy 
If market failures are tantamount with the fact that potentially mutual beneficial 
agreements are not struck, it seems somewhat natural that the first task of policy 
should  be  to  remove,  or  at  least  to  lessen,  the  obstacles  to  Pareto  improving 
voluntary agreements (this could be considered as the classical Coasean approach to 
economic policy). 
1.  Through the assignment of property rights, while taking into consideration the 
different consequences that alternative assignments of property rights can have 
in practice on the overall social outcome, the number of the concerned parties 
could  be  limited  and  the  free  rider  problem  reduced.  For  instance,  the 
assignment of a property right to the exploitation of a resource, blocking the free 
access of indeterminate third parties, limits the number of agents that could be 
part of an agreement about its exploitation. The possible interested third parties 
                                                 
14 As in the classical case of Ackerlof’s “market for lemons”.  
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could bid the right from those to whom the property right to its exploitation is 
conferred. This can avoid the tragedy of the commons, whereby those who may 
have an interest in an efficient exploitation of the resource are too numerous and 
indeterminate  (and  possibly  prone  to  free  rider  behaviour)  for  allowing  the 
practical possibility of striking an agreement as to its efficient management.
15 
This could be the common sense translation of the Coasean requirement of the 
suitable  assignment  of  property  rights  for  facilitating  Pareto  improving 
agreements.  Another  translation  could  be  that  by  assigning  well-defined 
property rights Pareto improving deals can be favoured because the uncertainty 
and legal indeterminacy of the absence of clear legal provisions are removed. In 
the assignment of property rights issue one may well include that of setting up 
and  maintaining  a  system  of  property  rights  protection  and  contract 
enforcement. 
2.  For similar reasons the explicit assignment of property rights could also reduce 
the  cost  of  contracting  to  manageable  proportions.  On  the  other  hand  it  is 
obvious that the assignment of property rights not necessarily can bring about 
the exploitation of all possible mutually advantageous exchanges. For instance, 
in the textbook case of pollution, if the subjects involved are many, and possibly 
necessarily indeterminate, the assignment of property rights may be not enough 
                                                 
15 Things are different in case of close-knit small communities where it is much more 
immediate to single out those interested in the efficient use of the common resource 
and  where  social  control  (the  repeated  game  framework  implied  by  the  daily 
contacts  of  the  members)  may  more  easily  prevent  free  riding  and  disruptive 
strategic behaviour. This applies for instance to the rules established and maintained 
by usage concerning the exploitation of the commons in the traditional medieval 
village (cf. Dahlman, 1980).  
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to lead to the exploitation, through cooperative agreements, of all the theoretical 
possibilities for Pareto improvements.
16 
3.  By  fixing  the  conditions  of  contracting  the  state  could  avoid  the  costs  and 
indeterminacies of bargaining, and at the same time pursue some distributional 
or  equity  objectives.
17  But  to  fix  the  terms so as to be compatible with the 
interest of all the concerned parties to implement, through cooperation, potential 
Pareto improvements could be an informationally impossible task. Moreover, 
these kinds of intervention may succumb to wishful thinking (as is often the 
case, for instance, with rent control). 
4.  By certifying the nature of the object of possible transactions and supplying 
information  the  state  could  reduce  those  uncertainties  as  to  the  object  of 
contracts that could block transactions. 
5.  State intervention should not be such as to make socially improving cooperation 
more  difficult  than  otherwise  could  be.  This  apparently  straightforward 
requirement is not so simple as it appears, however, since not all the possible 
agreements  lead  to  social  improvements, even if the assumed social welfare 
function has the Paretian property. A basic public task is to impede agreements 
that are social detracting (whatever the implied social welfare function may be). 
This  requires  distinguishing  between  social  detracting  and  social  improving 
contracts,  and  thus  to  have  a  set  of  institutions  for  controlling  agreements, 
allowing or prohibiting them according to their nature. 
                                                 
16  Let  us  for  instance  suppose  to  have a polluting factory and a great number of 
residents in the area of pollution. Whether the factory is given or denied the right to 
pollute it is practically impossible for the residents (all of them) and the factory to 
strike a deal. A deal could be more easily struck between the factory and the local 
representative authorities, but this involves issues of a different nature, which are 
considered in the next section. 
17 A straightforward example may be the fixing of minimum wages in a context of 
monopsonistic power in the labour market.  
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1.4  Social Improving and Social Detracting Transactions 
Indeed,  a  basic  difference  between  economic  systems  lies  in  the  kinds  of 
transactions that are seen as social detracting, and are therefore forbidden, or as 
social improving, and are therefore permitted. Under socialism, in its extreme or 
“classical”  Soviet-type  form,  all  kinds  of  contracts  between  private  individuals 
leading  to  the  hiring  of  labour  are  in  principle  forbidden.  Under  “capitalist” 
institutions, contracts of this sort are in principle allowed, and even encouraged. 
Under  most  regimes  a  set  of  voluntary  transactions  are  considered  to  be  social 
detracting and therefore forbidden, such as those aiming at carrying out all sort of 
criminal activities. In market economies some transactions can be forbidden that are 
specific of these economies, such as falsifying balance sheets, or agreeing about 
price-setting in a cartel. 
The reasons to forbid transactions can be intrinsic (for instance the transaction to 
sell  an  organ  for  transplant  in  exchange  for  money  or  other  utilities  is  seen  as 
unethical and therefore forbidden). But in most cases the basic reason to forbid 
certain types of transactions lies in the perceived external effects, in the short or in 
the  long  run.  From  a  “classical”  socialist  viewpoint  transactions  that  imply  the 
private  hiring  of  labour  are  supposed  to  lead  to  exploitation  and  alienation. 
Whatever the meanings of these words may be, these are seen as fundamental social 
evils, and therefore, as a matter of principle, the transactions alleged to bring them 
about are forbidden. Moreover other externalities of private market behaviour that 
are supposed to justify its suppression, according to what we may call the extreme 
socialist viewpoint, are considered to be the propensity to insufficient utilization of 
productive capacity, and macroeconomic instability generating the business cycle, 
as  well  as  the  tendency  to  produce  excessive  economic  inequalities.  Other  less 
sophisticated  views,  especially  in  more  backward  countries,  intrinsically  see 
transactions as a zero sum game: if somebody gains, it means somebody else loses, 
hence the lack of legitimation of private property rights in the eyes of vast sectors of 
society. This is even more so, as often may be the case in third world countries, 
under  conditions  of  widespread  violations  of  law  and  order  leading  to  private 
enrichment  through  socially  detracting  activities.  All  this  can  in  turn  limit  the  
papermaster.doc –  saved 07/09/03: 22.27 
11 
propensity  to  risk-taking  and  entrepreneurship  in  legitimate  social  improving 
activities, and contribute to perpetuate conditions of backwardness. 
1.5  The Externalities Issue 
If  we  abstract  from  transactions  that  are  considered  intrinsically  wrong  and  are 
forbidden because of ethical reasons, all other voluntary and informed transactions 
that do not generate negative external effects of some sort could be considered to be 
socially  advantageous,  from  a  Paretian  perspective.
18  But  in  reality transactions, 
indeed  all  sorts  of  human  activities,  usually  bring  about  non-negligible  external 
effects. Thus cooperation by some agents may lead to a Pareto non-comparable 
change, possibly even to a social worsening in the Kaldorian sense. (Obviously the 
latter  outcome  can  take  place  only  if  some  abstractly  possible  exchanges  are 
concretely blocked.) As there are hardly any human activities that are in practice 
deprived of effects on somebody else’s welfare, one must decide which external 
effects should be considered to be relevant and regulated by the state, and which 
instead should be considered as irrelevant and ignored. The external effects of a 
strictly economic nature, be they real or pecuniary, are a traditional economic policy 
concern.
19  Of  course,  from  a  Coasean  viewpoint  the  need  to  have  a  specific 
consideration  for  economic  externalities  does  not  exist,  once  the  state  has 
performed  its  role  in  attributing  property  rights  and  favouring  the  reduction  of 
transaction costs. Either the external interests do take care of themselves through 
Pareto improving cooperative agreements or, if those agreements are blocked by 
unavoidable  transaction  costs,  the  real  (transaction)  cost  of  internalizing  the 
                                                 
18 We are not going here into some delicate issues, that are beyond the simple Paretian 
framework,  such  as  the  issue  of  time  consistency  of  decisions  or  that  of  the 
formation of preferences, which would complicate the matter.  
19  Pecuniary  externalities  are  not  an  issue  in  the  general  equilibrium  perfectly 
competitive paradigm (and accordingly they have been neglected for a long time), 
but are very much relevant in an imperfectly competitive framework. See on this 
point Makowski and Ostroy (2001), pp. 529-531.  
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externalities  (such  as  those  needed  to  set  up  and  organize  markets)  makes  the 
internalization  of  externalities  constrained  Pareto  inefficient.
20  Whenever  this 
happens,  however,  the  coercive  intervention  of  the  state  could,  but  needs  not, 
remedy the situation. Moreover coercion is needed whenever changes that are not 
Pareto improvements (somebody loses) are seen as leading to socially preferable 
outcomes (obviously on the basis of evaluations that respond to criteria different 
from the Paretian principle). 
1.6  Hierarchical vs. Voluntary Coordination 
In  real  economies  command  by  some  in  authority  is  another  method  of 
coordination. Authority implies a hierarchy: hierarchies and command are methods 
of coordination alternative to markets and voluntary cooperation. Hierarchies can 
either be based on voluntary agreements (labour contracts in particular, which are 
founding  hierarchies  inside  the  firm)  or  result  from  coercion  and  sheer  (non-
contractually based) authority exertion (as in an army based on military draft, for 
instance, or in the traditional patriarchal family, or forced labour camps, or in slave 
societies).  Moreover  everywhere,  even  in  the  most  liberal  market  economies, 
widespread  elements  of  coercion are present in state activities such as taxation, 
maintenance of law and order, conscription. These activities are part of the most 
essential functions of every state, and to be effective they require some form of 
                                                 
20 According to Demsetz (1969), if there are theoretically unexploited possibilities of 
exchange, and the private parties concerned have freedom to contract, we do not 
have a situation of inefficiency because the cost of reaching the agreements is higher 
than the benefit to be reaped. On the other hand the costs of transaction themselves 
depend on the institutional arrangements, and can be dramatically reduced by public 
intervention (providing for instance relevant public goods such as the introduction 
of standards or legal enforcement of contracts), whose costs can be lower than the 
added value of the resulting transactions. Only coercive state intervention can, in 
particular, overcome the familiar free rider problem, which, not being addressed by 
Coase,  undermines  the  relevance  of  the  “Coase  theorem”  (cf.  Dixit  and  Olson, 
2000).  
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basic coordination (if only through implicit collusion) in setting up and maintaining 
the institutions (this means repetitive ways of behaviour) on which their very nature 
depends. The same applies to the institutions concerned with the organization of 
exchanges. The creation and maintenance of them require the setting up of rules of 
behaviour, in particular, but not necessarily so, by coordinated (and coercive) action 
by state authorities.
21 
Whatever  the  source  of  the  hierarchy,  the  basic  principle  of  hierarchical 
coordination  is  command.  This  would  present  no  problem  in  case  of  perfect 
information. But, because information is imperfect, agents in a hierarchy must be 
given a span, more or less large, of autonomous decision-making and part of their 
activities  must  be  coordinated  through  voluntary  cooperation  with  other  agents. 
Agents must also be persuaded to use their autonomous span of decision in the best 
interest of their organization. A way to proceed is through the structure of pay and 
the shaping of careers, as well as by internal discipline. Another is to build up an 
ethos and ideology so as to stimulate behaviour in hierarchies. One may only recall 
all the nationalistic paraphernalia of the states and the armies. But corporations too 
have  their  ethos  and  ideology.  Ethos  and  ideology  also  affect  the  nature  and 
productivity  of  market  interactions,  as  is  shown  by  the  classical  studies  on  the 
relationships between religion and market performance. 
1.7  Failures of the Market, Failures of the State, the Nirvana Fallacy, and the 
Reverse Nirvana Fallacy. 
Building up hierarchies as an alternative to voluntary (contractual) coordination can 
be justified whenever coordination through hierarchies brings about better overall 
results.  In  the  Coasean  view  of  the  firm,  the  firm  as  a  (contractually  founded) 
hierarchy  is  seen  as  being  more  efficient  than  market  relations  as  a  tool  of 
                                                 
21 The policing and organization of markets require the expenditure of resources that 
typically is not considered in the basic theoretical framework, but which introduces 
a type of transaction cost that (together with the other features considered in the 
text) constitutes an essential departure from it.  
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coordination, because of the economy in transaction costs that the firm brings about 
in comparison to relying on market contractual relations.
22 Under the notion of the 
economy in transaction costs one can also include the avoidance of opportunistic 
behaviour and hold-ups by occasional contractors, potentially disrupting production 
and distribution processes. Another, intermediate, way between the firm as a net of 
long-run contracts, allowing hierarchical coordination, and the alternative approach 
of relying on anonymous market transactions is the creation of formal or informal 
networks, binding personal and enterprise collaboration through formal or informal 
contractual relationships.
23 
Obligatory  membership,  hierarchy  and  command  are  organizational  principles 
intrinsic to the very nature of the state, with no need of a contractual foundation as 
in the firm, even if sometimes given a fictitious social contractual foundation in 
political theory. The idea that whenever the market system and contractually based 
voluntary cooperation fail, there is automatically a case for the state to intervene 
with remedial actions, out of his superior knowledge and organization, is seen these 
days as a fallacy, the well known Nirvana fallacy,
24 but was conventional wisdom in 
a not too distant past, dispelled both by experience and theoretical advances. It is 
conventional wisdom at present that along with the failures of the market there are 
the failures of hierarchies, and the failures of the state, and there is no guarantee that 
                                                 
22 For some further perspectives on the nature of the firm a comprehensive but concise 
summing up is provided by Hart (1989). 
23 Cf. Richardson (1972). For the nature of collaborative inter-firm relations one may 
refer in particular to Mariti and Smiley (1983). For the role of informal networks, 
sometimes based on ethnic, religious or family ties, see Coleman (1988), quoted in 
O'Brien (1999), where the preconditions to establish these kinds of informal network 
ties are seen as a component of social capital.  
24 Cf. Demsetz, 1969.  
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the  latter  are  any  less  damaging  than  the  first.
25  On  the  other  hand  one  should 
beware  of  the  reverse  Nirvana  fallacy,  rather  widespread  in  some  quarters,  of 
assuming that, because the state is imperfect, the market (in the general meaning of 
voluntary contracts of any sort) must necessarily lead to better results.
26 
2. THE EXTENDED COASEAN APPROACH TO ECONOMIC POLICY 
2.1 The Extended Coasean Approach and its Limitations 
Whenever potential socially improving agreements are frustrated by the obstacles 
that are resilient to the classical Coasean policy approach, such as those deriving 
from the indeterminacy of the interested parties, or their great number, leading to 
excessive  transaction  costs,  or  the  free  rider  and  social  action  problem,  public 
bodies, instead of resorting to direct and coercive measures, could become part of 
                                                 
25 As Stiglitz (1994, p. 243) puts it “We live in an imperfect world in which often we 
face nothing but the choice of the lesser of two evils!” 
26 There are some economists of the radical right who purport that because of general 
considerations (such as the special severity of agency problems in state organization 
as  well  as  the  assumed  logic  of  politicians’  and  bureaucrats’  behaviour)  state 
intervention, if only to furnish pure public goods, must be avoided. But this radical 
stance is proved to be incoherent by the usually unopposed acceptance of the fact 
that some basic public goods such as external security and law and order, including 
the assignment of property rights, must be provided by the state anyway. Thus one 
does not see why the suitability of publicly furnishing other public goods (instead of 
leaving the measure of their provision to the market, possibly through the creation of 
specific and costly barrier to access, with consequent undersupply) should not be 
considered case by case on its own merits instead of being dismissed by the sleight 
of a hand. 
27 The latter point is an important qualification to the advantages provided 
by  any  kind  of  policies  based  on  consensual  agreements,  such,  as  for  instance 
income policies based on covenants between the government and the representatives 
of organized social interests.  
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some  cooperative  agreement  as  the  elected  representatives  of  the  constituencies 
affected by the deal. We could conceive here an effective extension of the Coasean 
approach  to  economic  policy,  according  to  a  kind  of  generalized  subsidiarity 
viewpoint. The philosophy, based on the consideration that “the interested parties 
know  better”,  could  run  as  follows:  First  of  all  the  conditions  favouring  the 
autonomous cooperation of the interested parties for achieving social improving 
agreements  should  be  created,  if  possible,  by  reducing  transaction  costs  and  by 
suitable assignment of property rights. (The latter is a coercive measure against 
those who are excluded from property. So, in the assignment of property rights the 
coercive power of the state enters anyway.) If these conditions cannot be created, 
public authorities as legal representatives of their constituencies could be part of a 
deal. This requires the legal system to validate agreements of this kind. The above 
presents no problem whenever standard market transactions are involved. Things 
are  different  if  the  transactions  under  consideration  require  some  undertaking 
concerning the behaviour of authorities in their public decision making capacity (for 
instance a deal between a local public authority and an investing outside company 
including the pledge to shape the town plan so as to allow the company to use a 
given  parcel  of  land  for  building  its  plant,  or  to  construct  some  kind  of 
infrastructure, such as a road). Thus, in order for these kinds of agreements to be 
possible one needs to have the corresponding legal institutions in place. Otherwise 
their validation could be de facto granted by a suitable social and political context 
(one may refer here to the guarantee provided by the permanence of the local ruling 
structures  of  the  Communist  Party,  in  the  case  of  the  township  and  village 
enterprises in China, or, in a quite different context, in the industrial districts of 
Emilia Romagna). The advantage of reaching voluntary deals lies in the fact that 
they are revealed improving the state of all the parties of the deal (but obviously not 
the state of third parties that could also be affected).
27 This aspect is missing in case  
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public  bodies  implement  a  measure  in  their  coercive  capacity  (such  as  through 
expropriation, taxation, or regulation).
28  
On the other hand, if we do not want to be confined to policy measures supposed to 
lead to effective Pareto improvements only, coercive action is an obvious necessity 
(in particular in case of measures of a redistributive nature). Moreover, whatever 
way public bodies intervene, the possibility that their action be captive of private 
rent-seeking  interests  must  always  be  taken  into  account.  But  this  is  a  general 
problem of agency: whenever there is a delegation of responsibility there is always 
the possibility that the agents behave against the interest of the principals and to 
their own advantage. Outside the area of the state this is obvious in the case of 
corporations,  where  officers  can  act  in  different  well-known  ways  against  the 
interest  of  the  shareholders.
29  In  both  cases  supervision  and  control  may  be 
necessary. But here again, quis custodiat custodies?, and this applies to both cases. 
However there are some well known reasons why the agency problem in case of 
public bodies may be much more severe.
30 
2.2 The Present Relevance of the Extended Coasean Approach 
Coercive and substitute direct types of intervention have lost their appeal, through 
the  collapse  of  the  planned  economies,  the  manifestation  of  the  negative 
                                                 
28 However, some pledges concerning the use of these administrative powers by the 
public authorities concerned could be part of the deal. 
29 Such as through asset stripping or, as has come of prominence in recent times, 
cashing  in  stock  options  after  artificially  increasing  through  deceit  the  value  of 
shares One may recall in this connection Adam Smith’s pessimistic appraisal of the 
agency problem in joint stock companies (cf. Smith, 1976, 740-758).  
30 For instance the usually much greater number of ultimate principals (the voters) 
increasing the severity of the social action problem, and the fact that the option of 
“exit” is certainly more practicable for partners or shareholders than for members of 
political constituencies.   
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consequences of dirigistic policies all over the world, and the increasing awareness 
that, if the market fails, so does the state. Thus, the failure of coercive and substitute 
direct  types  of  intervention  enhances  the  interest  for  models  of  policy  creating 
opportunities for the coordination of decisions through mutual agreements by the 
agents  concerned  (public  or  private  they  be).  Different  varieties  of  this  kind  of 
approach  can  be  found  in  successful  applications  in  various  institutional  and 
geographical contexts. One may refer to the township and village enterprises in 
China, based on private-public (or local-state) partnerships, to specific aspects of 
Japanese and, more in general, far-Eastern industrial policies,
31 implying large scale 
private-public concerted action, and, turning closer to home, to certain aspects of 
the functioning of industrial districts or of successful regional economic systems 
(such  as  the  Baden-Württemberg  model)  in  Europe,  making  up  sorts  of 
“associational  economies”,  as  they  have  been  dubbed.
32  Lately  the  institutions 
leading to large scale policy interventions based on decentralized compacts between 
public  and  private  entities  have  been  introduced  in  Europe,  and  in  Italy,  in 
particular, with the aim to pursue objectives (such as regional development) that 
previously  would  have  been  thought  to  demand  direct  intervention  from  above 
through  planning  or  direct  public  economic  initiatives.  In  this  framework,  as 
instances of a cooperative, voluntary approach to economic policy, we may refer to 
the Italian set of institutions that go under the name of “programmazione negoziata” 
and  the  European  analogue,  the  “Employment  Territorial  Pacts”.  On  the 
macroeconomic level one may refer to policies based on contractual agreements 
between the representatives of public and organized interests (income policies). 
3. COORDINATION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENT  POLICY 
IN ITALY 
3.1 At the Macroeconomic Level 
                                                 
31 Cf. Aoki et alii (1997); Nakatani (1998). 
32 Cf. Cooke and Morgan, 1998.  
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Coordination of public and private decisions through voluntary agreements between 
the concerned parties has been an important aspect of Italian economic policies in 
the 90-ies, both at the macro and at the micro level.
33 At the macroeconomic level 
the income policy agreements of July 1992 and July 1993 played an essential part in 
the path towards financial stabilization that led first Italy away from the brink of 
financial  disaster  (in  1992)  and  then  to  rapid  disinflation  and  the  unexpected 
inclusion of Italy in the EMU from the start.
34 These agreements, which amounted 
to  pledges  of  coordinated  cooperative  behaviour  by  the  parties  concerned 
(government, trade and employer unions), apparently produced for them, as well as 
for the national economy as a whole, a much better overall outcome than could be 
expected from separate non-cooperative alternative courses of action. 
3.2 At the Local and Regional Level: the Territorial Pacts 
At the regional policy level, both aspects, of coordination of investment decisions 
and  of  coordination  of  private  and  public  initiatives,  have  found  in  Italy  an 
institutional counterpart in the territorial development pacts. The latter were pushed 
to the centre-stage of Italian regional development policy in the nineties, following 
the collapse of the previous dirigistic type of intervention, the so-called Intervento 
straordinario. As often is the case, Italian legislation is rather cumbersome. There 
are a number of different, complementary or overlapping, measures of so called 
negotiated  planning  (programmazione  negoziata)
35  whose  declared  aim  is  the 
coordination  of  economic  policy  measures  and  the  creation  of  private-public 
partnerships at the regional, or at any rate, local level.
36 The legal foundation of 
                                                 
33There is an important related issue, that of the coordination of economic policy 
authorities among themselves, which is however out of the scope of the present 
paper. 
34See Rossi, 1998, pp. 97 f. 
35Defined by art.1 of the law no. 104, 7/4/1995.  
36Up-to-date information can be found at: www.dps.tesoro.it.  
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territorial pacts lies in the law 23.12.1996, n. 662, even if the first launching of the 
institution  dates  back  to  April  1995.
37  Some  general  principles  of  consensual 
agreements as an admissible instruments of administrative action and policy had 
been stated previously by the law 241/1990 (art. 11, 14 and 15). 
In  what  follows  we  will  not  distinguish  between  the  different  types  of 
intervention,
38 referring in general to them as "territorial pacts". The alleged aim of 
these measures is to favour the coordination of activities at the local level, between 
public authorities themselves, and between public authorities and private parties, 
with the hope, among others, to stimulate bottom-up development and to replicate 
the  more  spontaneous,  successful  experience of Italian industrial districts.
39 The 
latter have been characterized by the beneficial interaction in time of the different 
private and public initiatives, which have resulted in static, but especially dynamic, 
economies of scale through external effects. .  
Unfortunately  the  institutional  provisions  regulating  territorial  pacts  have  been 
marred by a set of negative features, which have affected their implementation. The 
                                                 
37 Decreto legge 103/95 of 24 April 1995. 
38 It is not always possible to distinguish neatly the scope of the different institutional 
forms  of  the  “Programmazione  negoziata”  (such  as  “Intese  istituzionali  di 
programma”,  “Accordi  di  programma  quadro”,  “Patti  territoriali”,  “Contratti  di 
programma”, “Contratti d'area”). As we see in a moment a substantial aspect of all 
them  seems  to  be  the  basic  aim  to  draw  financial  resources,  and  in  particular 
subsidies, for local development. 
39  Another,  more  concrete,  hope  is  apparently  to  induce  the  local  authorities  to 
organize projects which could draw the support of European Union structural funds. 
In this respect at least the programmazione negoziata has been rather successful. 
40 
Some simplifications in the procedures of the patti territoriali have been introduced 
in 1997.   
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first one is the persistence of cumbersome administrative procedures.
40 A set of 
administrative bodies, both at the local, and at the central administrative level  have 
been compulsory involved in their elaboration and approval. This has led to the 
lengthening of procedures up to the point where the change in the factual situation 
makes the coordinated intervention uncoordinated or unsuitable any more. The legal 
framework includes some power to surrogate the local authorities in case of delay 
or procrastination, but it seems that the responsibility for delays lies often with the 
central authorities themselves.  
Moreover,  and  this  is  the  crux  of  the  matter,  territorial  pacts  imply  substantial 
funding (for investment and for employment) from the state or EU (especially in the 
Mezzogiorno), up to 80% of investment expenditure,
41 and this, rather than genuine 
coordination of decisions seems to be the objective that is really pursued in practice, 
leading to an improper use of the institutional instrument: If the objective is the 
pursuit  of  the  coordination  of  decisions  between  different,  public  and  private, 
economic agents, whose decisions interrelate one with another, what is required is 
the  setting  up  of  legal  instruments  to  validate  compacts  between  the  agents 
concerned,  and,  perhaps,  some  advisory  agency,  helping  with  ideation  of 
coordinated projects and interventions, and reducing transaction costs through its 
mediation  and  initiative.  Subsidies  falsify  the  coordination  exercise,  artificially 
inducing  the  creation  of  coordinating  structures  where  none  are  needed,  and 
encouraging  the  elaboration  of fake coordination projects. Ideally, the scope for 
agreements should be left to the judgement of the agents concerned, provided the 
commitment of each of them remains inside their powers and responsibilities. In 
practice subsidies may be justified to induce compliance: if you abide by the terms 
of  the  agreement  you  receive  the  subsidy,  otherwise  you  do  not.  Other,  legal, 
instruments for ensuring compliance would in theory be available but one can have 
some doubts on their real efficacy.  
                                                 
41 See CIPE, Deliberazione 21 marzo 1997, art. 2.9 d).   
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Some  further  misgivings  apply  to  the  ad  hoc  introduction  of  exemptions  from 
administrative procedures and attenuation of labour relations constraints. It is not 
clear why the rules should be attenuated with respect to territorial pacts and not in 
general, if they are too rigid, or upkept in any case, if their respect is supposed to 
lead  to  better  social  outcomes.
42  If  the  issue  lies  in  the  existence  of  social  and 
economic conditions that bring about a large divergence between social and private 
costs at the local level, the most straightforward way to intervene would be toward 
the reduction of this divergence. Finally, if the issue lies in lack of appropriability of 
external  effects,  and  free  riding,  this  issue  is  not  entirely  resolved  through  the 
voluntary stipulation of pacts (even if the latter can lead to the endogenization of 
some externalities), but may require some form of coercive or direct intervention. 
One should also consider that the organization and implementation of territorial 
pacts  are  not  devoid  of  real  costs,  administrative  and  otherwise.  The  financial 
resources that are used for the initiatives envisaged in the pacts have an obvious 
opportunity  cost,  if  only  in  terms  of  reduced  financing  of  other  alternative 
initiatives, and there is no prima facie reason why credit at concessionary rates 
should be included, as is usually the case, not to speak of the huge investment 
subsidies that have been mentioned above. 
On  the  other  hand  the  subsidies  and  sundry  advantages  that  are  offered  may 
stimulate local initiative and coordination which otherwise would stay latent, and 
lead to the creation of some social capital through the effort, however artificial, in 
coordinating decisions. Much depends on the extend of subsidies; some subsidies 
may be an incentive to local initiative and project-making. Too much may lead to 
waste of resources and the creation of economic initiatives which may not be self-
                                                 
42 In reality in the period in which the territorial pacts were introduced a consensus 
was emerging that the norms that regulate employment contracts in Italy were much 
too rigid and a cause of unemployment. Pending a wholesale rehauling of Italian 
labour relations, some weakening of existing rules were introduced in a piecemeal 
fashion, among others in the design of territorial pacts.  
papermaster.doc –  saved 07/09/03: 22.27 
23 
supporting  in  the  long  run  (not  unlike  the  previous  centralized  development 
planning experience of the Cassa del Mezzogiorno).
43 Moreover, another crucial 
aspect is the nature of the subsidies. While direct subsidies to private initiatives 
(such  as  subsidization  of  interest  or  capital  payments  by  private  investors)  are 
hardly justifiable in view of past experience, financing and organizing the creation 
of infrastructures and in general the provision of public or collective goods that are 
functional to an overall coherent set of coordinated decisions enter naturally in the 
scope of public intervention. 
4 CONCLUSION 
Whenever  the  Coasean  approach  of  favouring  the  agreements  between  the 
concerned parties cannot be used to remedy market failures, for instance because of 
the large number or indeterminacy of them, or the intractability of the free rider 
problem, instead of resorting to the more traditional forms of public policy through 
the direct or coercive action of the state one could turn to what we may call the 
extended  Coasean  approach  to  public  policy,  centring  on  the  setting  up  of  the 
conditions  whereby  public  authorities,  as  representatives  of  the  concerned 
constituencies, could strike voluntary deals between themselves, and with private 
parties, so as to arrive to some desired overall social improvement. Thus in theory 
there  is  a  strong  case  for  setting  up  institutions  for  favouring  the  voluntary 
coordination of various private and public decisions. In practice the suitability of 
these institutions depends on the quality of public intervention and organization that 
would  be  brought  about  by  them.
  The  way  to  favour  socially  improving 
coordinating  agreements  is  for  the  state  to  introduce  into  the  legal  system 
instruments for their determination, enforcement and validation, and, at the same 
time,  to  provide  some  suitable  contribution  to  the  provision  of  the  required 
                                                 
43This applies in particular to investment subsidies in the South. For an appraisal of 
some more successful experiences of territorial pacts elsewhere, see Regalia (2002), 
pp. 7-9.  
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institutional infrastructure. In the practice of European territorial pacts these have 
been vehicles for the distribution of subsidies. But this is only one possible, and not 
particular commendable, use of this kind of institution of economic coordination. 
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